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I.  DISTRUSTING TRUST 
Public distrust erodes the efficiency and productivity of our economy, 
government, and society.  It accelerates and amplifies weaknesses in our 
democratic political infrastructure alongside business relationships and social 
interactions in mutually reinforcing ways.  Determining how to cultivate 
public trust depends on definitions of “the public”: to whom the government 
and its officials are accountable.  Given the history of the United States as a 
White settler colonial state, its dependence on African chattel slavery, and its 
continuing racist xenophobia, “the public” is a frustratingly elastic term.  For 
marginalized populations, public trust might vary in intensity over the past 
centuries since the nation's founding.  In analyses and assessments of levels 
of trust in the strength or fragility of public institutions, Black, Indigenous and 
people of color (“BIPOC”) have often been excluded from the polls and 
surveys upon which public opinion or sentiment is based.  A lack of public 
trust in government significantly impacts determinations of constitutional rot 
and renewal; however, in the absence of BIPOC responses and inclusion in 
“the public” over the centuries of U.S. history, constitutional rot for 
marginalized populations has been an ongoing emergency in their continual 
lack of or restricted access to constitutional rights and protections.  This 
perpetual constitutional rot is far from an unusual condition.  
Policymakers and pundits look to influential surveys to assess levels of 
trust.  From 1964 to 1980, public trust in federal government fell fifty 
percentage points, from seventy-seven to twenty-seven percent.1  With peaks 
of forty-four percent in 1983 and fifty-four percent in 2002, public trust has 
languished well under fifty percent since 1980.  Public trust dropped to its 
lowest, fifteen percent, in 2010 and has hovered between fifteen and twenty 
percent since.  The Organisation for Economic Co-operation and 
Development (“OECD”) identifies the compounding drawbacks of public 
distrust: “A decline in trust can lead to lower rates of compliance with rules 
and regulations.  Citizens and businesses can also become more risk-averse, 
delaying investment, innovation and employment decisions that are essential 
to regain competitiveness and jumpstart growth.”2  The lack of public trust 
has long-term costs that undermine the legitimacy of the rule of law and the 
government that creates and enforces it. 
 
1. Lee Rainie et al., Trust and Distrust in America, Pew Res. Ctr.: U.S. Policy & 
Politics (Jul. 22, 2019), https://www.pewresearch.org/politics/2019/07/22/trust-and-
distrust-in-america/ [https://perma.cc/CL9N-QVWK]; Public Trust in Government: 
1958-2019, PEW RESEARCH CENTER (Apr. 11, 2019), 
https://www.pewresearch.org/politics/2019/04/11/public-trust-in-government-1958-
2019/ [https://perma.cc/UD6T-67J6]. 
2. Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development [hereinafter 
“OECD”], Government at a Glance 2013 20 (2013), https://www.oecd-
ilibrary.org/governance/government-at-a-glance-2013_gov_glance-2013-en 
[https://perma.cc/A79F-9CAL]; Public Trust in Government: 1958-2019, supra note 
1. 
2
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Trust can be defined as “positive perception” or “confidence” in the 
actions of individuals or institutions.3  It is a necessary precondition for 
cooperation – which philosopher Diego Gambetta defines as the “abstention 
from mutual injury”4 – and which undergirds the most basic interactions of 
daily life: “from marriage to economic development, from buying a second-
hand car to international affairs, from the minutiae of social life to the 
continuation of life on earth.”5 
Trust is often perceived as the oil that greases the wheels of our 
foundational institutions; distrust can disrupt the smooth functioning of these 
systems.  In his 2019 book, The Cycles of Constitutional Time, Jack M. Balkin 
identifies how our political system functions in three primary cycles: of 
regimes, polarization, and constitutional rot and renewal.6  All three cycles 
depend on public trust and themselves produce increases or decreases in trust 
at various points in the cycle.7  These cycles are useful typologies of decline 
and recovery, and Balkin’s discussion serves as an exhortation for readers of 
one political moment to move from one stage of a regime to a better one, from 
polarization to depolarization and from rot to renewal.  The difficulty of 
analysis, of definitively apprising where we are in the cycles – whether on our 
way down or poised upward – stems from trust functioning simultaneously as 
an indicator, cause, or outcome. Trust might indicate a future trajectory, push 
us toward renewal or rot, or result from where we are in the cycle, 
respectively.  In this Article, I focus on the third cycle of constitutional rot and 
renewal in order to evaluate the general assumption that political compromise 
could foster more trust, and that more trust would lead to more cooperation.  
In positing the notion of constitutional rot, Balkin argues that we can 
evaluate the “failures” or weakening of democracy and republicanism: a 
decrease or lack of “responsiveness to public opinion and public will” and 
“public officials’ devotion to the public good.”8  Balkin details further 
essential criteria of rot in the political system:  
When public servants are increasingly diverted into the pursuit of their 
own wealth, or when they are increasingly diverted into serving the 
interests of a relatively small number of very powerful individuals, 
democracy and republicanism decay, and we have constitutional rot.  
And when public officials are no longer responsive either to public will 
or to the public good, and instead serve the interests of a small group 
 
3. OECD, supra note 2, at 21; Public Trust in Government: 1958-2019, supra 
note 1. 
4. Diego Gambetta, Can We Trust Trust? in MAKING AND BREAKING 
COOPERATIVE RELATIONS 215 (1988). 
5. Diego Gambetta, Foreword, in TRUST: MAKING AND BREAKING 
COOPERATIVE RELATIONS ix, ix–x (Diego Gambetta ed. 1988). 
6. JACK M. BALKIN, THE CYCLES OF CONSTITUTIONAL TIME 6 (2020) 
7. Id. at 46–49. 
8. Id. at 45. 
3
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of powerful and wealthy people, the result is oligarchy – rule by the 
few.9   
The first two decades of the twenty-first century easily illustrate some of these 
warnings.  Economic inequality has skyrocketed in the aftermath of the 2007–
09 Great Recession and deepened during the COVID-19 lockdowns despite a 
global Occupy movement and some reforms and regulations in response to 
the global financial crisis.10  The police murders of, and brutality against, 
Black people have garnered more national and international media attention 
over the safety of Blacks in the privacy of their own homes or out in public.11  
Vote denial and dilution has contracted and attenuated the power of voters 
through gerrymandering, voter intimidation, lax voting rights enforcement, 
and restrictive voter identification laws; the dismantling of the 1965 Voting 
Rights Act in Shelby County v. Holder was the most prominent federal 
example.12  In campaign finance deregulation, Citizens United v. 
FEC greenlighted the creation of “super PACs” with opaque donor lists and 
unlimited corporate general fund donations, and McCutcheon v. 
FEC removed the biennial aggregate spending cap for individual donors and 
allowed unlimited aggregate donations  – although contributions to any 
 
9. Id. 
10. See Greg Iacurci, The Legacy of 2020: Riches for the wealthy, well educated 
and often White, financial pain for others (Jan. 1, 2021, 9:05 AM), 
https://www.cnbc.com/2021/01/01/the-covid-recession-brought-extreme-inequality-
in-2020.html [https://perma.cc/R3JE-YC6F]; Juliana Menasce Horowitz et. al, PEW 
RESEARCH CENTER, Trends in Income and Wealth Inequality (Jan. 9, 2020), 
https://www.pewsocialtrends.org/2020/01/09/trends-in-income-and-wealth-
inequality/ [https://perma.cc/3Y6A-KNWP]; Ray Sanchez, CNN, Occupy Wall 
Street: 5 Years Later (Sept. 16, 2016, 3:50 PM), 
https://www.cnn.com/2016/09/16/us/occupy-wall-street-protest-
movements/index.html [https://perma.cc/R473-BHVE]. 
11. Jorge L. Ortiz, ‘It’s Nothing but Pain’: The Latest on the Cases of Violence 
against Black People that Sparked America’s Racial Reckoning, USA TODAY (Sept. 
9, 2020, 9:28 AM), https://www.usatoday.com/story/news/nation/2020/09/09/george-
floyd-breonna-taylor-jacob-blake-what-we-know/5753696002/ 
[https://perma.cc/C847-SEZQ]; Khaleda Rahman, From George Floyd to Breonna 
Taylor, Remembering the Black People Killed by Police in 2020, NEWSWEEK (Dec. 
29, 2020, 12:14 PM), https://www.newsweek.com/george-floyd-breonna-taylor-
black-people-police-killed-1556285 [https://perma.cc/4VZ8-E9KB]; Oge Egbuonu, 
Breonna Taylor and George Floyd both Deserve Justice. But Justice for Black Women 
is Elusive, NBC NEWS (June 26, 2020, 11:54 AM), 
https://www.nbcnews.com/think/opinion/breonna-taylor-george-floyd-both-deserve-
justice-justice-black-women-ncna1232190 [https://perma.cc/WS8G-T9ZK]. 
12. 507 U.S. 529, 556–57 (2013) (holding §4(b) of the Voting Rights Act of 
1965 unconstitutional); see Lynn M. Itagaki, The Racial Laundering of Equality after 
Shelby County v. Holder, in THE SHADOW OF SELMA 264–88 (Henry K. Lozano & Joe 
Street, eds. 2018). 
4
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individual candidate were still capped, an individual donor could contribute 
up to the maximum amount to unlimited candidates.13 
In The Cycles of Constitutional Time, Balkin identifies two further 
dimensions of constitutional rot and renewal that impede or facilitate 
government: levels of cooperation and trust in institutions.  Constitutional rot 
and renewal rests on the choices of public officials and fellow citizens to 
uphold “political norms of mutual forbearance and fair political competition 
that make it possible for people who disagree with each other to jointly pursue 
the public good.”14  Legal and political systems, however elaborate and 
sophisticated, cannot incentivize all behaviors to engage in effective 
governance: “Republics depend on more than mere obedience to the letter of 
the law.  They depend on well-functioning institutions that balance and check 
power and ambition, and conventions that require government officials to 
behave in a public-spirited fashion.”15  
Given the repeated emphasis on the public good, public opinion, and 
public will, the notion of the public obviously plays a crucial role in public 
trust.  The problem of public trust is that the term “public” has not referred to 
the same constituency since the first voting cycle of the new republic, and the 
opinions and preferences of those excluded are ignored.  “The public” is 
constituted legally and politically as a grouping of citizens and eligible voters, 
and government officials and policymakers are perceived most accountable to 
this public.  Although in everyday conversations we might refer to “the 
public” and U.S. eligible voters as if these terms always included all citizens, 
say over eighteen years old, the “public” of public opinion, public will, and 
public good has shifted along with the expansion and contraction of the 
franchise.  And despite an implicitly anachronistic, stable assumption of a 
continuous body politic – that people who are citizens and voters today would 
have been eligible for citizenship, naturalization, or the franchise in the past – 
elected officials and policymakers of the day are thought to be held most 
accountable to their current constituents and voters since those people can 
vote to keep them in or kick them out of office.  However, the vagaries of 
campaign finance and electoral politics have vaulted mega-donors to the 
forefront,16 which has further contracted the notion of the “public” to whom 
 
13. See Citizens United v. Fed. Election Comm’n, 558 U.S. 310, 365–66 (2010) 
(holding inter alia that the government may not suppress political speech based on 
corporate identity and could not limit corporate independent expenditures); 
McCutcheon v. Fed. Election Comm’n, 572 U.S. 185, 192–93 (2014) (holding that 
aggregate limits on campaign expenditures violated the First Amendment); Lynn M. 
Itagaki, United States, Inc.—Citizens United and the Shareholder Citizen, KALFOU, 
Fall 2014, at 114, 114–136.   
14. BALKIN supra note 6, at 45.  
15. Id. 
16. David Callahan & J. Mijin Cha, Stacked Deck: How the Dominance of 
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government is accountable.  The public to whom the judiciary is accountable 
has also changed as judges and justices are more often noticed by elected 
officials through ideological and political networks of think tanks and elite 
donors and write their opinions for such audiences.17 
When we claim we are for the public good, are we implicitly defining 
the public as constituted of likeminded people with similar political interests 
and goals?  In other words, not only is the notion of the public good widely 
varying but so is the notion of the public itself.  Considering the eighteenth-
century Anglo-American historical context of traditional liberalism, political 
theorist Wendy Brown points out that liberalism’s fundamental unit is the 
family, but not all of its persons were members of the public and enfranchised 
citizens.18  White Christian straight male property owners, as heads of 
households, possessed not only land, buildings, equipment, tools, and 
furniture, but also people: wives, children, and enslaved persons.19  In the first 
decades of the new republic, a much smaller community of White propertied 
men constituted eligible voters and were the public to which policymakers 
were accountable and elected officials beholden.20  Even as the notion of the 
public has expanded (and variously contracted) to include these 
unenfranchised members of the household and those segregated or excluded 
as “a race so different,”21 for example, and the two Americas of rich and poor, 
of White and BIPOC, map onto the franchised and the disenfranchised: the 
citizen and the noncitizen are unevenly incorporated with varying influence 
into “the public.”  For almost two centuries of formal BIPOC 
disenfranchisement, American democracy was one of continual constitutional 
rot and crisis that might arguably persist into the present day.22  Lack of 
 
17. BALKIN supra note 6, at 120–21. 
18. WENDY BROWN, STATES OF INJURY: POWER AND FREEDOM IN LATE 
MODERNITY 150–51 (1995). 
19. Id. at 149. 
20. Despite the 1790 Naturalization Act that had property requirements for 
becoming a United States citizen in addition to gender and racial ones, some states 
allowed women who owned property and free African Americans to vote. The exact 
number is difficult to assess but hovers around eighteen percent of the adult population 
(including women and African Americans who could or could not vote depending on 
the state) or twenty percent of the total White population (including women who could 
or could not vote depending on the state and minors). See generally, Dave Umhoefer, 
Mark Pocan says less than 25 percent of population could vote when Constitution was 
written” POLITIFACT (Apr. 16, 2015), 
https://www.politifact.com/factchecks/2015/apr/16/mark-pocan/mark-pocan-says-
less-25-percent-population-could-v/ 
21. Plessy v. Ferguson, 163 U.S. 537, 561 (1896) (Harlan, J., dissenting) (Harlan 
was referring to Chinese immigrants who were accorded some White privileges of 
riding in first-class train cars when Black citizens were denied; the majority opinion 
in this case established the “separate but equal” doctrine). 
22. LYNN MIE ITAGAKI, CIVIL RACISM: THE 1992 LOS ANGELES REBELLION AND 
THE CRISIS OF RACIAL BURNOUT 19–22 (2016) (defining crisis in relation to interracial 
conflict). 
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political will, enforcement, and accountability has produced a hierarchy of 
citizenship that reinforces ideological, racial, and religious hierarchies.  Under 
polarization, party membership resuscitates old and creates new forms of 
inclusion and exclusion in the concept of the “the public”:  Democrats are un-
American for being anti-capitalists, socialists, and communists; Republicans 
are anti-democratic for supporting authoritarianism, warmongering, and 
oligarchic capitalism. 
In The Cycles of Constitutional Time, Balkin is directly responding to 
the Trump Administration and the aftermath of the 2007–2009 global 
economic crisis, Tea Party movement, Movement for Black Lives, and 
landmark Supreme Court decisions striking down or invalidating legislative 
voting protections, such as the Voting Rights Act.23  However, the situation 
of constitutional rot seems to be much more longstanding and pervasive than 
the four or eight years of any presidential administration as Balkin readily 
recognizes.  Given the above definition of constitutional rot that privileges the 
“interests of a small group of powerful and wealthy people,” the founding 
documents of our nation themselves – the Declaration of Independence, the 
Constitution, the Bill of Rights – are deeply rooted in constitutional rot and 
constitutional crisis.24  Centuries-long “slow violences”25 of second-class 
citizenship and designations of sub-humanity have allowed crimes against 
humanity, pain, suffering, and inequity to go unrecognized and unredressed, 
and these harms continue to haunt descendants and survivors into the present: 
land theft and genocide of Indigenous peoples, enslavement of African 
peoples, and xenophobic terror and harassment.  Constitutional crisis, rot, and 
renewal is experienced unevenly, often vastly so. 
I want to dwell further on this long history of contradictions.  Balkin 
himself admits this situation:  
Constitutional rot is a relative term, like being tall or short.  It denotes 
a period of backsliding in democratic and republican norms and 
institutions, after a period of increasing democratization, or, at least, 
relative stability.  This caveat is important because the United States 
has never been fully democratic or republican . . . When I say that 
constitutional rot is the gradual loss of democracy and republicanism, 
 
23. BALKIN, supra note 6, at 3, 8. 
24. Id. at 45. 
25. Nixon defines slow violence as “a violence that occurs gradually and out of 
sight, a violence of delayed destruction that is dispersed across time and space, an 
attritional violence that is typically not viewed as violence at all. Violence is 
customarily conceived as an event or action that is immediate in time, explosive and 
spectacular in space, and as erupting into instant sensational visibility. We need, I 
believe, to engage a different kind of violence, a violence that is neither spectacular 
nor instantaneous, but rather incremental and accretive, its calamitous repercussions 
playing out across a range of temporal scales.” ROB NIXON, SLOW VIOLENCE AND THE 
ENVIRONMENTALISM OF THE POOR 2 (2011). 
7
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therefore, I am speaking of a relative decline from an already imperfect 
system.26 
In this Article, I consider how this “imperfect system” is deliberately and 
intentionally created and maintained. 
In fact, the democracy for some has been cultivated and enshrined amid 
authoritarianism for everyone else.  Political scientist Howard Winant has 
called the United States a racial dictatorship and, with sociologist Michael 
Omi in their classic study, Racial Formation in the United States, also a form 
of racial despotism that lasted until the end of Jim Crow segregation in the 
1960s and 1970s.27  Thus, the protection and strengthening of White interests 
are seen by their proponents and beneficiaries as constitutional renewal, not 
rot.  History reminds us that Southern Democrats called themselves the 
“redeemers,” promoting the so-called “Redemption” after the end of 
Reconstruction and the end of federal protection of Black rights.28  These stark 
terms of dictatorship and despotism force a nation with a foundational myth 
of democratic republicanism to reckon with its corollary failures: freedom for 
some and second-class citizenship, enslavement, dispossession, exclusion, 
and genocide for the rest. 
Indeed, one person’s constitutional rot is another’s renewal.  One 
person’s harbingers of rot are another’s signs of renewal.  Determinations of 
constitutional rot or renewal are not objective facts, especially when given the 
deep and enduring polarization and marginalization of certain segments of the 
polity.  The contraction of democracy and exclusion of people from the rights 
and protections of full citizens can be seen, as it was after 1877, as renewal or 
“redemption.”  This conflict over which persons are allowed entry into “the 
public” is a struggle over who experiences constitutional rot, renewal, or crisis 
at each juncture.  I posit that the notion of one’s rot and another’s renewal can 
be identified through cycles of the strengthening and weakening of what 
historian Gary Gerstle has termed civic nationalism and racial nationalism.29  
Civic nationalism is a secular trust in  
the transformative power of the United States not in God but in the 
nation’s core political ideals, in the American belief in the fundamental 
equality of all human beings, in every individual’s inalienable rights 
 
26. BALKIN, supra note 6, at 45. 
27. For “racial dictatorship,” see HOWARD WINANT, THE NEW POLITICS OF 
RACE: GLOBALISM, DIFFERENCE, JUSTICE 205 (University of Minnesota Press 
2004).  For “racial despotism,” see generally MICHAEL OMI & HOWARD WINANT, 
RACIAL FORMATION IN THE UNITED STATES (2014). 
28. See generally, ERIC FONER, NOTHING BUT FREEDOM: EMANCIPATION AND 
ITS LEGACY 39–73 (2007); James T. Moore, Redeemers Reconsidered: Change and 
Continuity in the Democratic South, 1870-1900, 44 J. OF S. HIST. 357, 357 (1978). 
29. GARY GERSTLE, AMERICAN CRUCIBLE: RACE AND NATION IN THE 
TWENTIETH CENTURY 3–11 (2001). 
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to life, liberty, and the pursuit of happiness, and in a democratic 
government that derives its legitimacy from the people’s consent.30   
An integral part of the American Dream, these tenets of civic nationalism form 
the cornerstone of American exceptionalism, the American way, and the 
American Creed – this last concept what Gunnar Myrdal conceived of as 
driving political faith and public trust in the moral principles of U.S. 
governance.31  Moreover, these democratic founding principles are portable 
and can develop anywhere. 
When branches of government curtail voting rights or blatantly fail to 
enforce and uphold the full rights and protections of all citizens, and when the 
public appears to support these actions, civic nationalism falters, and this 
failure often signals the rise of racial nationalism. The end of Reconstruction 
exemplifies this weakening of civic nationalism and strengthening of racial 
nationalism:   
Throughout its history, however, American civic nationalism has 
contended with another potent ideological inheritance, a racial 
nationalism that conceives of America in ethnoracial terms, as a people 
held together by common blood and skin color and by an inherited 
fitness or self-government.  This ideal, too, was inscribed in the 
Constitution (although not in the Declaration of Independence), which 
endorsed the enslavement of Africans in the southern states, and it was 
encoded in a key 1790 law limiting naturalization to “free white 
persons.”32  
In more recent critical debates, racial nationalism is the prerogative of 
White Christian settler colonialism, a political eugenics of democratic 
expression.  It is colloquially expressed as “White is right” and that justice is 
“just us” for Whites, as poet and scholar Claudia Rankine’s collection of 
essays, Just Us: An American Conversation, has discussed.33  The competing 
notions of freedom offered by civic nationalism and racial nationalism are the 
political calculus for most policy issues.  The former can and often has led to 
an expansion of those who are afforded the rights and protections of full 
citizens and strengthened those rights and protections by facilitating the 
accountability of those in power to newly franchised stakeholders. Racial 
nationalism can and often has led to the contraction of those who can claim 
citizenship, residence, and the rights and protections provided by government.  
Constitutional instruments are often unenforced for marginalized groups who 
are dehumanized to legitimize their victimization, and this lack of 
 
30. Id. at 4. 
31. Id.; see generally, GUNNAR MYRDAL, AN AMERICAN DILEMMA; THE NEGRO 
PROBLEM AND MODERN DEMOCRACY (1944). 
32. GERSTLE, supra note 28, at 4. 
33. CLAUDIA RANKINE, JUST US: AN AMERICAN CONVERSATION (2020). 
9
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enforcement excludes them from being claims-bearing complainants to whom 
governments and “the public” are accountable.   
II.  COMPROMISE, CONSENSUS, COMMON GROUND 
Although compromise is a useful political strategy and necessary for 
human relations, the much-heralded political compromises of the first century 
of United States history all involved the continued existence of White 
supremacy and racial despotism through labor and personhood stolen from 
enslaved Africans on land stolen from Indigenous peoples.  Known through 
popular history as such, the allegedly great compromises of the eighteenth and 
nineteenth centuries underwrote the expansion of slavery through the death 
and displacement of Indigenous populations, whether the Three-Fifths 
Compromise that brought slave states to support the Constitution or the 
Compromise of 1850 that tried to preserve the Union. 
How does trust function in these political negotiations?  From popular 
belief to scholarly treatises, trust is most often manifested in cooperation and 
mutually beneficial relationships.  Most people will generally advocate for 
political leaders to seek compromise, cooperation, common ground, and even 
consensus.  They usually extoll these virtues in their everyday, interpersonal 
situations.  Strong trust builds social cohesion which “increase[s] the 
efficiency and effectiveness of government operations” and allows  
governments “to act without having to resort to coercion.”34  
Political polarization threatens this cooperation and the trust it fosters. 
Despite these high levels of polarization, however, the Pew Research Center 
found a consensus across both parties in nine of the top ten issues facing 
Americans and overwhelming agreement for “keeping the country safe from 
terrorism (91%), responding to natural disasters (87%) and ensuring safe food 
and medicine (87%).”35  A majority of self-identified Democrats and 
Republicans agreed that “government should play a major role” in six other 
issues relating to the economy, environment, immigration, infrastructure, 
poverty, and public health.36  In only one of the ten issues did a minority of 
Republicans (42 percent) in contrast to a vast majority of Democrats (85 
percent) favor the government playing a major role in “ensuring access to 
healthcare”37 – recording the highest difference between parties at 43 percent.  
The next two issues with the most variance between party-affiliated 
respondents showed a slim majority of Republicans believing the government 
should play a large part in “protecting the environment” (52 percent) and 
 
34. OECD, supra note 2, at 21. 
35. Americans’ View of Government: Low Trust, but Some Positive 
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“helping people get out of poverty” (50 percent)  whereas Democrats were 90 
percent and 74 percent, respectively.38 
In more alarming results regarding compromise and common ground, 
the Georgetown Institute of Politics and Public Service Battleground Poll in 
April and October 2019 added a few statements related to civility for 
respondents to agree or disagree with, such as the “political, racial, and class 
divisions in this country are getting worse and our national dialogue is 
breaking down,” or “I am frustrated by the uncivil and rude behavior of many 
politicians.”39  With percentages between 77 to 83 for the former and 88 to 90 
percent for the latter, respondents clearly signaled their beliefs that politicians, 
pundits, and the public were divided, unable to dialogue, and uncivil.  In 
response to the statement, “Compromise and common ground should be the 
goal for political leaders,” an overwhelming majority – 85 percent in April 
and 87 percent in October – agreed.40  Pew’s mid-2020 survey on public trust 
in federal government also revealed that most respondents “say that 
Americans can solve problems” and wanted the federal government to 
continue working on a variety of issues.41  Implicitly, these relatively stable 
majorities demonstrate a trust in the federal government’s capacity for 
improving people’s lives.  To act on these findings still requires political 
compromise and cooperation, which often depend on mutual trust. 
Of these terms promoting agreement and mutuality, compromise is one 
of the most complex.  Beyond the notion of consensus as general agreement, 
compromise is reached through concessions made by all parties.  Admittedly, 
compromise has negative connotations: it can signal “the acceptance of 
standards that are lower than is desirable.”42  And, the related adjectives 
“compromising” or “compromised” can mean shameful as well as a 
discredited position and weakened status. 
Cooperation and trust, like dissension and distrust, are strategies that are 
not always the most effective depending on the circumstances.  Diego 
Gambetta trenchantly asks, “Can we trust trust?”43  He points out that 
cooperation and trust are not uniformly desirable in all situations.44  In 
economic and political contexts, a healthy and productive competition 
 
38. Id. 
39. October 2019 Civility Poll, GEORGETOWN UNIV. INST. OF POLITICS AND PUB. 
SERV. (Oct. 2019), https://politics.georgetown.edu/battleground-poll/october-2019/ 
[https://perma.cc/8T96-EXC3] (see “Graphics and Slides” 
https://drive.google.com/file/d/1ucvkLBbDkV31UjkXHcnty3ftWz2fb0Dy/view). 
This poll is run semi-annually by the Institute of Politics at Georgetown University 
with Republican-leaning and Democrat-leaning polling outfits.  
40. Id. 
41. Americans’ View of Government: Low Trust, but Some Positive 
Performance Ratings, supra note 34. 
42. Compromise, LEXICO (last visited Mar. 15, 2021), 
https://www.lexico.com/en/definition/compromise [https://perma.cc/8DRX-WG6Y]. 
43. Gambetta, supra note 4, at 213. 
44. Id. at 215. 
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“enriching the human lot” might be warranted before cooperation, although 
this effective competition might depend on trust in one’s competitors and the 
perception of mutual benefits.45  One side might actively thwart cooperation 
and trust in those on the other side: for example, among a nation’s enemies, 
however identified.  Propaganda, disinformation, agent provocateurs, and 
other strategies of psychological warfare have been used to foment dissension 
and distrust among perceived enemies of the state, whether foreign nations or 
domestic organizations.  On a personal level, abuse, gaslighting, and other 
forms of manipulation work to foster distrust in a victim’s own cognition. 
Compromise, as a political strategy, necessitates trust and cooperation 
after or even before a period of competition in laying the ground rules, as in 
international trade agreements.  Compromise cultivates and indicates trust in 
the system.  Here, I return to another important exhortation in Balkin’s 
definition of constitutional rot: the cohesion of “the public” supporting the 
republic depends “on mutual toleration and forbearance that makes it possible 
for contending sides to view each other not as implacable enemies that must 
be eliminated but as fellow citizens who, despite their differences, all aim at 
the larger goal of serving the res publica.”46  What happens when a republic 
incorporates people who have been historically perceived as implacable 
enemies?  Racial nationalism identifies nonwhite, often non-Christian and 
non-European citizens and immigrants as these implacable enemies, and this 
flexible, catch-all category of threat to the American way of life and American 
institutions is useful for racist appeals and demagoguery. 
Specifically, the famed compromises throughout U.S. history that have 
ostensibly “healed the Union” have reunited White ruling factions to protect 
White interests: (1) the Three-Fifths Compromise that constitutionally 
cemented the electoral representation of enslaved persons but not their 
freedom nor franchise;47 (2) the antebellum compromises that balanced 
“slave” and “free” states’ entry into the Union;48 and (3) the Compromise of 
1877 that guaranteed states’ autonomy to disenfranchise and terrorize their 
unenslaved people.49  These compromises have reinforced the continued 
 
45. Id. at 5. 
46. BALKIN, supra note 6, at 45. 
47. See U.S. CONST. art. I, § 2, cl. 3 (“Representatives and direct Taxes shall be 
apportioned among the several States which may be included within this Union, 
according to their respective Numbers, which shall be determined by adding to the 
whole Number of free Persons… three fifths of all other Persons.”) (emphasis added). 
48. See Missouri Compromise, ENCYCLOPEDIA BRITANNICA (last visited Jan. 31, 
2021), https://www.britannica.com/event/Missouri-Compromise (discussing the 
extension of slavery through the Missouri Compromise of 1820, the Kansas-Nebraska 
Act of 1854, and the Compromise of 1850). 
49. See Michael L. Benedict, Southern Democrats in the Crisis of 1876-1877: A 
Reconsideration of Reunion and Reaction, 46 J. OF S. HIST. 489, 489–90 (1980) (“In 
return for southern Democratic support at his inauguration, [President] Hayes agreed 
to end the interference in southern states that was no irrelevant to northern Republican 
industrial interests.”). I use Patricia J. Williams’ term “unenslaved” to recognize the 
varying states of unfreedom experienced by Black people after their ostensible 
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dominance of White supremacy. White power elites have reaffirmed and 
consolidated the prerogatives of Whites by the expulsion and rejection of the 
rights and privileges of nonwhites, a category that has also included Jews, 
Muslims, Irish, and southern and eastern Europeans, in addition to African 
enslaved persons, Indigenous peoples, or Asian aliens ineligible for 
citizenship.  Compromise has been achieved through the exploitation of the 
physical bodies and legal personhood of the most historically vulnerable or 
those most often excluded.  Mutuality and cooperation often effectuate the 
continued power of White supremacy in U.S. politics, society, economics, and 
culture.  In fact, compromise that reestablishes trust has often restricted the 
very notion of who can belong to the public itself and furthered exclusion.  
Consensus has often been achieved through normalizing the violence of White 
supremacy and redefining the public good as resources primarily allocated to 
Whites.  The promise of White superiority produces trust repeatedly 
throughout U.S. history. 
III.  CONCLUSION 
In the decades following Reconstruction, local, state, and federal 
governments refused to enforce the Fourteenth and Fifteenth Amendments 
and racial terror increased at this “nadir” of United States history.50  Leading 
Black intellectuals founded The Crisis, the official journal of the NAACP in 
November 1910.51 Writing for the editorial page, W.E.B. Du Bois marked the 
journal’s establishment during a “critical time in the history of the 
advancement of men,” and  The Crisis editorials would “stand for the rights 
of men, irrespective of color or race, for the highest ideals of American 
democracy, and for [the] reasonable but earnest and persistent attempt to gain 
these rights and realize these ideals.”52  His words resonate now, as some 
populations have been forced to continually negotiate constitutional crises 
over their civil and human rights since the moment of the Constitution’s 
crafting and ratification.  While this crisis has waxed and waned in intensity, 
it has been a crisis for much longer than the first shots fired on Fort Sumter 
and the agreement at Appomattox.53 
 
emancipation in 1863. PATRICIA J. WILLIAMS, THE ALCHEMY OF RACE AND RIGHTS 4, 
143–47 (1992). 
50. RAYFORD LOGAN, The Negro in American Life and Thought: The Nadir, 
1877–1901 (1954). 
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Public trust has proven a crucial factor in turning the cycles of 
constitutional time and amplifying the cyclical highs and lows of rot and 
renewal.  A strategy of compromise that increases trust through mutual 
cooperation is often implicitly advocated to smooth over polarization or begin 
a constitutional renewal.  However, the most pivotal compromises in U.S. 
history were made among political elites who represented wealthy White 
interests and who made decisions about the lives of people who were 
disenfranchised, dispossessed, and enslaved, and these marginalized people 
had interests of their own that were scarcely represented and mostly 
countermanded.  While advocating for renewed trust through cooperation, we 
must recognize and prevent the ways in which these famed compromises 
further entrenched discrimination. These legacies of exclusion and inequality 
continue to negatively impact the opportunities and quality of life for many 
people today.  
 
[https://perma.cc/Q89J-N27X] (“April 9th, 1865, was the end of the Civil War for 
General Robert E. Lee and the Confederate Army of Northern Virginia.”).   
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